Constitutional Law—Imprisonment for Debt—“Worthless Check” Acts by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 1 
January 1929 
Constitutional Law—Imprisonment for Debt—“Worthless Check” 
Acts 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Constitutional Law—Imprisonment for Debt—“Worthless Check” Acts, 15 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 096 (1929). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss1/12 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IPRISONMENT FOR DEBT--'WORTHLESS CHECK"
AcTs.n a recent case the defendant was indicted for making and deliver-
ing a "cold check" under a statute punishing the making or delivering of a
check, draft, or order for payment of money without sufficient funds, re-
gardless of fraudulent intent or knowledge. Held, that the statute, since it
did not make fraud an element of the crime, violated the provision in the
state constitution forbidding imprisonment for debt, and was therefore
void. Burnham v. Commonwealth (1929), 228 Ky. 410, 155 S. W. (2d) 256.
The constitutions of many of the states contain provisions prohibiting
arrest and imprisonment for debt. Cases of fraud are usually excepted
from this provision either expressly or by judicial interpretation.
5 C. J. 438. Statutes making it a criminal offense to issue a check with-
out funds to meet it, the so-called "worthless check" acts, have been held
generally not to violate constitutional provisions against imprisonment for
debt. But in all these cases, with one exception, the statutes involved re-
quire the element of fraud in the transaction. Both knowledge on the
part of the maker of the check or lack of funds and an intent to defraud
are essential. State v. Pilling (1909), 53 Wash. 464, 102 Pac. 230; State
v. Meeks (Ariz. 1926), 247 Pac. 1099. Or they require merely a knowledge
of the insufficiency or lack of funds. Hollis v. State (1921), 152 Ga. 182,
108 S. E. 783; State v. Avery (1922), 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838; State v.
Yarboro (1927), 194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216. In the single exception noted,
the case of Neidlinger v. State (1916), 17 Ga. App. 811, 88 S. E. 687, where
the statute required neither intent to defraud nor knowledge of insufficiency
or lack of funds, the court read into the statute a requirement of fraudulent
intent, holding that unless the statute did require such intent it would be
invalid, since it would violate the constitutional provision against imprison-
ment for debt. Although this is the only case which contains an express
statement to this effect, the inference may be clearly drawn from the
other cases that it is the requirement of fraudulent intent which relieves
the statutes of constitutional objection.
The principal case, although it is the first case to hold a "worthless
check" act unconstitutional, is in accord with the spirit of previous de-
cisions upholding such acts where proof of fraudulent intent is made es-
sential. And it is certainly consistent with the humane policy which has
resulted in the near-extinction of the control of the creditor over the person
of his debtor. P. S. A., '31.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIARY-
PowER OvER BAR ADmISsIONS.-Petitioner, having previously been disbar-
red by the Court of Appeals, applied to it for readmission to the practice
of law. A statute provided that the Supreme Court should have the power
of admission and disbarment, but that all applications for admission and
readmission should be made to a board of governors of the state bar asso-
ciation. Held, that the statute is invalid as an encroachment on the power
of the courts. Nevertheless, since the court believed that the procedure
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